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LOT NETwork Too Big for Antitrust?
by ROBERT YANG*

ABSTRACT
While companies, inventors, institutions, and other patent holders have
generally monetized their patents in some way, some entities have found that
asserting patent rights is a lucrative alternative to traditional avenues of
intellectual property (“IP”) monetization. Patent assertion lawsuits, especially
those initiated by Patent Assertion Entities (“PAE”), have grown at an
exponential rate over the last decade. These lawsuits have caused disruptions
from industries ranging from pharmaceuticals to the auto-making industry
through damage awards in litigation and “preempting” companies to divert
funding towards potential future litigation. The License on Transfer Network
(“LOT Network”) is one of many solutions developed to combat PAE —
specifically by cross-licensing patents between members of the pool. Google
and some patent pooling systems are no strangers to violating antitrust laws.
This paper looks at how an attacking PAE or an antitrust watchdog would react
to this particular type of licensing agreement.
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I. Introduction
Patent troll activity — the enforcement of patent rights against an
accused infringer by a nonpracticing entity — has been on the rise for some
time. In response, operating companies have developed numerous strategies
to protect themselves against these Patent Assertion Entities (“PAE”). The
License on Transfer Network (“LOT Network”) is but one of these attempts
to combat the rising PAE threat. The LOT Network tries to reduce PAE
litigation by removing the number of viable patents available to PAEs.
Member companies essentially enter into a conditional cross-licensing
arrangement; this functions to deter improper infringement claims since the
patent cannot be asserted against other LOT members.1 This paper will look
at how antitrust regulators or attacking PAEs might react to this particular
licensing arrangement.
This note is divided into three sections. Section I will explain the LOT
Network model and how it proposes to combat the PAE problem. Section II
will provide a general framework behind the crossroads of Antitrust and
Patent Law. Next, Section III will explain how this framework is applied to
the LOT network. Finally, we conclude that the pro-competitive benefits of
the LOT Network should help it avoid any serious antitrust issues.
To “promote the progress of science and useful arts, the U.S. patent
system gives inventors a limited monopoly to exploit their invention.”2
Essentially, patent holders gain a legally enforceable right to commercially
exploit their invention — usually by excluding others from practicing the
patented invention or licensing these rights to another entity.3 However,
some patent right holders, either owners or assignees, do not utilize the patent
for research or manufacture. Instead, these entities “pursue other goals of
interest to their founders and investors.”4 These non-practicing entities fall
under two broad categories: (1) research institutions that license out

1. See LOT Network, http://www.lotnet.com (last visited Mar. 24, 2016) [hereinafter LOT
Website].
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. See USPTO, GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERNING PATENTS (2015), http://www.
uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-concerning-patents.
4. Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 1
(2011).
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innovations instead of manufacturing products and (2) entities that exist to
acquire patents for the sole purpose of asserting against operating companies.5
The second category is sometimes referred to as PAEs, or colloquially,
patent trolls.
In the words of former U.S. President Barack Obama, PAEs “. . . don’t
actually produce anything themselves . . . [but] just trying to essentially
leverage and hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they can extort some
money out of them.”6 PAEs do not develop or practice patents themselves,
and instead acquire patents for the sole purpose of obtaining profit through
patent assertion litigation.7 In other words, the PAE business model is based
solely on “purchasing and asserting patents against manufacturers already
using the technology, rather than developing and transferring technology.”8
In this broken framework, some observers believe that abuse by PAEs is just
a symptom of the current patent system’s defects.9
The year preceding this writing, 2015, was the second biggest year for
patent suits. By one estimate, patent assertion litigation in 2015 saw the most
patent disputes filed in U.S. history — Unified Patents estimates that 5,769
were filed in Federal Court and 1,796 disputes were filed with the Patent
Trademark and Appeals Board at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”).10 For reference, these lawsuits account for two-thirds of all
cases filed in the Federal District Court system.11 Another report found that
between 2005 and 2014, PAE initiated lawsuits increased 500%.12 Today,

5. Id. at 1; see also Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives
and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1572 (2009) (“The
term NPE generally refers to a patentee that does not make products or ‘practice’ its inventions.”).
6. See Watch: President Obama Answers Your Questions in a Google+ Hangout, THE
WHITE HOUSE (Feb 2, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/02/14/watch-presidentobama-answers-your-questions-google-hangout.
7. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE 8 (2011), www.ftc.
gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf; see also Marianna Galstyan, Who Are Patent Trolls &
How Do They Work?, INVESTOPIA (July 15, 2015), http://www.investopedia.com/articles
/investing/071515/who-are-patent-trolls-how-do-they-work.asp.
8. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7.
9. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2013); see also Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Patent Assertion
Entities and Antitrust: A Competition Cure For A Litigation Disease?, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 501 (2014).
10. 2015 Patent Dispute Report, UNIFIED PATENTS (Dec. 31, 2015), http://unified
patents.com/2015-year-end-report. Note that Unified Patents also includes litigation initiated by
PAEs or Declaratory Judgments initiated by operating companies against PAEs.
11. Id.
12. PatentFreedom: Latest NPE Litigation Activity Update, ARTICLE ONE PARTNERS BLOG
(Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.articleonepartners.com/blog/patentfreedom-latest-npe-litigation-activ
ity-update/.
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those lawsuits are estimated to cost U.S. publicly traded firms roughly $80
billion annually — with $29 billion in direct litigation expenditures.13
Indeed, the PAE problem can only get worse as PAEs continue to acquire
more patents, usually from operating companies.14
In the absence of meaningful action by Congress, the USPTO, or the
judicial system, private entities have formulated their own solutions in
response to the PAE problem.15 Generally, these “alternative licensing
alternatives” can be categorized as: (1) defensive patent aggregators (“patent
pools”), (2) patent pledges, and (3) patent troll insurance.16 Patent pools are
private contractual agreements where separate patent owners transfer their
rights into a common holding company to jointly license their products.17
Patent pledges are voluntary public commitments made by companies to
license their own patents in a particular way in order to support open
innovation.18 Recently, some defensive patent aggregators and some
organizations for advertisers began offering litigation insurance against PAE
initiated lawsuits.19
The LOT Network is unique that it is a conditional cross-licensing
arrangement that falls somewhere between the alternative-licensing
categories of cross-licensing agreement, patent pools, and patent pledges.
Cross licensing agreements are similar to patent pools, except that instead of a
common holding company, companies mutually execute overlapping patent
rights to each other.20 As explained below, this note will not differentiate
between the different technology licensing arrangements.
The LOT Network was designed to curb abuse by PAEs by reducing
the amount of viable patents available to PAEs. Under the LOT Agreement,

13. James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. 387 (2014).
14. Dan McCurdy, Sr. Vice Pres., RPX presentation at the 2015 IP Counsel Café Spring
Meeting in Palo Alto, Cal. (Apr. 22-24, 2015); LOT Website, supra note 1; see also Ewing &
Feldman, supra note 4 (Intellectual Venture, for example, obtains patents from turnkey licensing
services for small- to medium-sized businesses that they then assert against other operating
companies while paying the licensor a cash payment plus a percentage of income earned.).
15. See Marta Belcher & John Casey, Hacking the Patent System: A Guide to Alternative
Patent Licensing for Innovators, JUELSGAARD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & INNOVATION CLINIC
(May 2014), https://www.eff.org/files/2014/05/29/hacking_the_patent_system.pdf.
16. Id.
17. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1340 (1996); see also Ewing & Feldman,
supra note 4.
18. See Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47(3) ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543, 546 (2015).
19. See Belcher & Casey, supra note 15.
20. Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE L.J. 360, 369 (1999).
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member companies grant each other a license to all of their patents, but that
license only becomes effective when the patent leaves the network and falls
into the hands of a PAE.21 As the LOT Network gains members, this effect
will multiply as more companies bring their patent portfolios into the fold.
This essay explores the LOT Network and how, like some crosslicensing arrangements, it has the potential to be anticompetitive for entities
outside the LOT Network. First, patent acquisitions are subject to antitrust
laws.22 Although antitrust laws do not impose a general prohibition against
the alienability of property, they do prohibit discreet acquisitions that
threaten to create or anticompetitively facilitate the exercise of market
power.23 Second, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) [collectively herein “Agencies”] apply the same
antitrust analysis with respect to patents (and other forms of intellectual
property).24 Specifically, the Agencies evaluate anticompetitive effects
under the rule of reason by finding market power, anticompetitive effects,
and proof that the anticompetitive effects outweigh the pro-competitive
benefits.25
Antitrust laws sometimes prevent the assertion of certain intellectual
property rights.26 However, the FTC has recognized that while IP licensing
arrangements are “typically welfare-enhancing and pro-competitive,
antitrust issues may nonetheless arise.”27 With big name members (some of
which are probably competitors) like Google, Uber, Dropbox, Canon, JP
Morgan Chase, Ford, and Solar City pooling more than 327,000 worldwide
patent assets (including over 100,000 U.S. issued patents), the LOT Network
may have market power in a properly defined market.28

21. See LOT Agreement: Frequently Asked Questions, LOT NETWORK, http://lotnet.com/faq/
(last visited Mar. 8, 2016) [hereinafter LOT Agreement FAQs].
22. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox, 645 F.2d 1195, 1205 (2d Cir. 1981) (“Patent acquisitions are
not immune for the antitrust laws.”).
23. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATION
AMONG COMPETITORS (2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/
joint-venture-hearings-antitrust-guidelines-collaboration-among-competitors/ftcdojguidelines-2.pdf.
24. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 2 (1995), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
atr/legacy/2006/04/27/0558.pdf [hereinafter IP Licensing Guidelines or Guidelines].
25. See Robin Feldman, The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is it Patent Misuse?, 6
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 117 (2004).
26. See, e.g., Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 996 (9th Cir. 1979) (condemning
bad faith and objectively baseless patent assertion by a monopolist).
27. IP Licensing Guidelines, supra note 24, at 7.
28. Email from LOT Network Administration, Lot Network, Inc., to Robert Yang, Author,
UC Hastings (Feb. 2, 2016, 14:25 PST) (on file with author).
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If the LOT Network does have market power, it will be weighed against
the pro-competitive benefits. Another argument is that the LOT Network
might reduce competition, restrict supply, or have an impermissible field of
use restriction. However, licenses are conditional; supply might not be
impacted unless there is a transfer of patent to a PAE. The LOT Network
does not permit PAEs (a defined term) from entering the network, which
might be seen as an impressible barrier to competition at first glance — after
all, each and every entity that meet this requirement are per se excluded. But,
PAEs do not actually produce anything — they are not competitors.

II. The LOT Network
In 2004, Google, as part of a coalition of tech companies, launched the
LOT Network in an effort to disarm PAEs. Google describes the LOT
Network as “an industry-led networked, royalty-free patent cross licensing
agreement for transferred patents . . . [where] every company that
participates grants a license to the other participants . . . when patents are
transferred to non-participants.”29 The program is meant to protect
participants against patent attacks brought by PAEs that obtains a LOTpledged patent, while preserving each member’s full use of their retained
portfolio.30 The license functions like a covenant that runs with the land and
attaches to the patent so it will always be enforceable if obtained by a PAE.
Also, the LOT Agreement is administered by LOT Networks Inc., an
independent third party company.31
The LOT Network is unique in the sense that it has substantial aspects
of a patent pool, a traditional cross-licensing arrangement, and a patent
pledge. The LOT Network is similar to a pool in the sense that all members
grant each other a conditional cross-license, but the patents are only fully
vested upon a “triggering event” — mainly when control of a patent becomes
owned or controlled by a PAE. Also, “PAE” is a defined term in the LOT
Agreement. PAEs or “Assertion Entity” is defined as an entity and each of
its affiliates who collectively derive more than half of their total consolidated
gross revenue over a span of 12 months from patent assertion (another
defined term).32

29. Google Patent Programs: LOT Agreement, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/patents/
licensing/lot/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. LOT Agreement Version 2.0, LOT NETWORK (Nov. 24, 2015), http://lotnet.com/
download-lot-agreement/ (“‘Assertion Entity’ means an Entity and each one of its affiliates if such
Entity and all its Affiliates collectively derived from Patent Assertion more than half of their total
consolidated gross revenue measured over the full twelve (12) months preceding a particular date
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Each arrangement operates differently and has different tradeoffs for
both companies and its impact on innovation. The LOT Network can be seen
either as a cross-licensing agreement, a patent pool, or a patent pledge (since
full licenses are technically not given out up-front). As the IP Licensing
Guidelines does not make a meaningful distinction between cross-licensing
and patent pools, the remainder of this note will not distinguish between
these forms.
Defensive patent aggregators (or patent pools), which include Unified
Patents and RPX, use membership fees (or pulled resources) to buy patents
to give perpetual licenses to its members to prevent subsequent patent
holders from suing for infringement.33 This methodology ensures that the
patent can never be asserted against the pool participants, as each member
now possesses a perpetual license. These entities are differentiated from
PAEs because they only buy patents solely for defensive purposes and
pledge to never offensively assert the patents they own.34 Also, some pools
can challenge, invalidate, or amass prior art on patents.35 These companies,
as well as other professional organizations, also provide insurance against
patent troll litigation.36
In contrast, patent pledges are usually more informal self-limiting
commitments. These are voluntary public commitments made by companies
to license their own patents in a particular way in order to support open
innovation.37 Traditionally, these are non-contractual commitments made to
the public at large by a patent holder in the absence of direct compensation.38
One prominent example was Tesla Motors decision to not “initiate patent
lawsuits against anyone who, in good faith, wants to use [Tesla’s]
technology.”39 Other entities have initiated multilateral pledges where
companies opt into networks that have the same pledge — these include the
Defensive Patent License, Open Innovation Network, Twitter’s Innovator’s

. . . In addition, an Entity and each of its Affiliates will be deemed to be an Assertion Entity if the
Entity or any of its Affiliates has, as of a particular date, a goal or plan approved by senior
management or a senior executive (or under which the Entity has begun to receive revenue) to
derive from Patent Assertion, either directly, or indirectly through one or more of its Affiliates,
more than half of the total consolidated gross revenue of such Entity and its Affiliates collectively
in any twelve (12) month period including or after that particular date.”).
33. See Belcher & Casey, supra note 15.
34. Id. at 4.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 21.
37. See Contreras, supra note 18.
38. Id.
39. Elon Musk, All Our Patents Belong to You, TESLA BLOG (June 12, 2014), http://
www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you.
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Patent Agreement, The Patent Pledge, and The LOT Network. Patent pledges
can make powerful public statement about a company’s value, but can also
lower the patent’s market value.41
LOT Network functions much like a hybrid patent pool and pledge
where each member grants a license to each other, but becomes effective
only upon a “triggering event.” The LOT Network also functions like a
pledge by having members promise that every patent they own will be
subject to a license if sold to a PAE. Members must grant, in a written
contract, a portfolio-wide, present, fully vested and irrevocable license to all
other LOT participants.42 This license is “worldwide, royalty-free, nonexclusive, non-sublicensable, [and] non-transferable.43 In other words,
members mutually grant each other a full but conditional license to their
entire patent portfolio.
However, the LOT Agreement does not require members to crosslicense each other in the traditional sense.44 Member companies can still
cross-license to each other if they so choose, but there is no requirement in
the LOT Agreement itself. There are two exceptions for when the license
does not become effective: (1) when the patent is transferred to another LOT
member, or (2) when a transfer is part of a legitimate spinout or change of
control to a non-PAE.45 The license condition is in place to protect against
patent litigation whenever a PAE acquires a LOT-pledged patent to assert
against members of the LOT Network. Other than that restriction, LOT
members retain all patent rights and can sell, assert, or license their patents
to anyone (both in and out of the LOT Network), unless the buyer or
exclusive licensee is or becomes a PAE.46
Unlike traditional patent pledges, LOT members pay an annual fee
based on their annual revenue in order to cover the costs of the program. The
annual fees ranges from $1,500 to $20,000 (at the time of this writing) and
are generally low to encourage participation.47 Members must also sign the
same LOT Agreement, which is nonnegotiable.48

40. See Belcher & Casey, supra note 15, at 10.
41. Id.
42. See LOT Agreement Version 2.0, supra note 32.
43. Id.
44. See LOT Agreement FAQs, supra note 21.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Email from Ken Seddon, LOT Network CEO, Lot Network, Inc., to Robert Yang, Author,
UC Hastings (Feb. 25, 2016, 15:24 PST) (on file with author).
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LOT members can withdraw at any time, maybe to preserve an
exclusive property right. LOT members are required to give six months’
notice to withdraw, but get to keep the LOT licenses it acquired during its
membership (except those that are transferred to PAEs after its
withdrawal).49 Likewise, the pre-withdrawal patents are still subject to the
obligations of the LOT Agreement, but only to members who were active at
the time of withdrawal.50
Primarily, the LOT Network was designed to protect members from
privateering and reduce the number of patent infringement claims by PAEs.
Privateering is the practice where an operating company sells or licenses a
patent to a PAE to attack other operating companies.51 The LOT Network
does not, however, protect against direct suits brought by another member or
suits regarding patents acquired outside of the LOT Network. Since the
licenses only become effective upon a transfer to a PAE, LOT members can
still assert their patents directly against other members.52
By participating in the LOT Network, companies are able to obtain
direct protection against PAE litigation in regards to patents owned by other
LOT members. Overall, the LOT Network intends to disrupt the current
PAE cycle by reducing the amount of potential targets available to them.
However, the LOT Network needs more operating companies to join in to
further increase the long-term risk reduction.

III. Crossroads of Antitrust and Patent Law
Today, the relationship between antitrust laws and patent law is
generally viewed as complimentary. However, this was not always the case
— the former prevailing view was that the relationship between antitrust and
patent law were at odds with one another.53 Specifically, antitrust laws
promote innovation by prohibiting specific actions that can harm
competition — mainly monopolizing in a way that hurts consumers
(generally raising prices or reducing output).54 Contrast this with patent law
in the United States that confers the rights to exclude others from making,

49. See LOT Agreement FAQs, supra note 21.
50. Id.
51. See Thomas L. Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by
Corporations and Investors: IP Privateering & Modern Letters of Marque & Reprisal, 4 HASTINGS
SCI. & TECH. L.J. (2011).
52. See LOT Agreement FAQs, supra note 21.
53. Xerox, 645 F.2d at 1203 (“[T]he primary purpose of the antitrust laws to preserve
competition can be frustrated, albeit temporarily, by a holder’s exercise of the patent’s inherent
exclusionary power during its term.”).
54. See 15 U.S.C. §2; see also Ewing & Feldman, supra note 4, at 35.
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using, or selling the invention claimed by the patent for a limited period of
time.55 As time went on, the legal perspective evolved and federal agencies
have come to see patents as essentially comparable to any other form of
property.56 In the words of the Federal Circuit, the “aims and objectives of
patent and antitrust laws may seem, at first glance, wholly at odds. However,
the two bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are aimed at
encouraging innovation, industry and competition.”57
The Sherman Antitrust Act has been used to prohibit unreasonable
restraint on trade. Section One governs coordinated conduct that can be
deemed to be anticompetitive — “every contract, commination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States . . . is declared to be illegal.”58 Section Two reaches
unilateral conduct that can lead to monopoly power and takes predatory steps
to exclude rivals. Specifically, “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce . . . shall be
deemed guilty of a felony . . .”59 Although most enforcement actions are
civil, the Sherman Act also empowers the DOJ to bring criminal suits.60
Additionally, the Federal Trade Commission Act bans “unfair methods of
competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”61 The FTC usually
enforces this act because it prohibits the same types of activities as the
Sherman Act.62 This note will focus on Section One of the Sherman Act,
namely potential coordinated conduct among the LOT Network member
companies.
The U.S. patent system exists to promote the progress of science, to
promote the betterment of society. This is accomplished by giving an
inventor a monopolistic opportunity to exploit his invention. However, a
patent alone does not grant market power in the antitrust sense of the word.63
For example, holding a patent on Linux does not create market power since

55. 35 U.S.C. §154 (1988).
56. See IP Licensing Guidelines, supra note 24, at 2.
57. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
58. 15 U.S.C §1 (2004).
59. 15 U.S.C §2 (2004).
60. The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition
-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Mar. 9, 2016).
61. See 15 U.S.C. §§41-58.
62. See The Antitrust Laws, supra note 60 (“Criminal prosecution are typically limited to
intentional and clear violations such as when competitors fix prices or rig bids.”).
63. Robin Feldman, Patent and Antitrust: Differing Shades of Meaning, 13 VA. J. OF LAW &
TECH. 5 (2008).
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substitutes are readily available in, for example, Microsoft’s Windows and
Apple’s OS.
With this backdrop, the DOJ and FTC have recognized the difficulty
posed by different patent licensing agreements. This problem may be
compounded by the fact that the LOT Network does not fit neatly into
traditional categories. In 1995, the Agencies published their IP Guidelines
to assist “those who need to predict whether the Agencies will challenge a
practice as anticompetitive.”64 The Guideline was published with the
intention of balancing monopolistic behavior with continued innovation.65
Specifically, the Guidelines sets forth three general principles: (1)
intellectual property is treated like any other form of property, (2) intellectual
property are presumed to not create market power in the antitrust context,
and (3) combining complementary factors of production is generally seen as
pro-competitive.66 The third principal seems to be an exception to the
antitrust laws by permitting holders of blocking patents to pool their patents
and jointly set a royalty rate.67
It is also helpful to set forth a few definitions used in the Guidelines.
First, there does not seem to be a difference between different cross-licensing
arrangements. The guideline simply states the “cross-licensing and pooling
arrangements are agreements of two or more owners of different items of
intellectual property to license one another or third parties.”68 As the LOT
Network functions like a blend of those arrangements, this simplifies the
analysis.
Second, the Guidelines differentiate between competing,
complementary, and blocking patents. Competing patent are usually
substitutes for each other, complementary patents cover technologies that
complement each other without being substitutes, and a patent is blocking
when it cannot be practiced without infringing a basic patent.69 As it stands,
the LOT Network’s “conditional patent pool” contains a large number of
different patents — many of which are likely to be competing,
complimentary, or blocking. Third, the analysis is different depending on
the horizontal or vertical relationship of the parties. A vertical relationship,
like a typical licensing agreement, has activities that are in a complimentary

64. IP Licensing Guidelines, supra note 24, at 1.
65. Id. at 2.
66. Id.
67. Id.; see also Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON
REG. 359 (1999).
68. Id. at 28.
69. See generally Roger Andewelt, Analysis of Patent Pools Under the Antitrust Laws, 53
ANTITRUST L.J. 611 (1984).
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70

relationship.
The classic example being a component manufacturer
licensed to combine with other components into the final product. By
contrast, a relationship is horizontal when parties would be actual or likely
potential competitors in the absence of a license.71 Parties can have
substantial aspects of both horizontal and vertical components. The LOT
Network has no barriers to entry for operating entities (besides a fee and
meeting the definition of an operating company) and thus welcomes all
parties (including direct competitors like Ford, Mazda, Subaru, Kia, and
Hyundai).
Antitrust concerns are most common when the licensor and licensee are
in a horizontal relationship. However, the existence of a horizontal
relationship alone does not necessarily mean that an arrangement is
anticompetitive.72 On the other hand, the Guidelines do recognize that by
foreclosing access to or significantly raising the prices of an important input,
may be an anticompetitive licensing restriction.73
In the vast majority of cases, the Agencies evaluate licensing
agreements under “the rule of reason.”74 In the other cases, where a
restraint’s “nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive,” the
Agencies will treat it as a per se violation without looking at the procompetitive aspects.75 The Guidelines list naked price fixing, output
restraints, and market division among horizontal competitors, group
boycotts, and resale price maintenance in license agreements as examples to
per se unlawful restraints.76 When evaluating a restraint under the rule of
reason, the Agencies will “inquire whether the restraint is likely to have
anticompetitive effects and, if so, whether the restraint is reasonably
necessary to achieve pro-competitive benefits that outweigh those
anticompetitive effects” or whether the parties could have achieved similar
effects with less restrictive means.77 The reasoning is that economic theory
holds that bringing certain patents together into common ownership can
produce certain efficiencies.78

70. See IP Licensing Guidelines, supra note 24, at 13.
71. Id. at 14.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 16.
74. Id.
75. National Society of Professional Engineers v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
76. See IP Licensing Guidelines, supra note 24, at 16.
77. Id.
78. “The Cournot-complements effect arises when multiple input owners each charge more
than marginal cost for their input, thereby raising the price of the downstream product and reducing
sales of that product. Effectively, each input supplier imposes a negative externality on other

Summer 2017]

LOT NETwork

175

Unfortunately, if improperly managed, a patent pool can be used to
stifle competition and raise prices for consumers. Historical examples
include John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil, which was able to inflate prices and
hold off competitors by using patent pools.79 Another example is when Summit
and VISX pooled their patents on LASIK devices to extract $250 per treatment
for devices using their patents until the FTC intervened.80
An often-discussed case study is the Moving Pictures Expert Group
Licensing Administration (“MPEG LA”) patent pool. MPEG LA is a limited
liability company that administers the pooling of digital video patents
deemed essential for the MPEG-2 video compression technology.81 After
seeking ex ante approval from the DOJ, MPEG LA received three DOJ
Business Review Letters from 1997 to 1999.82 These DOJ letters are credited
as the bedrock of modern antitrust counseling.83 In those letters, the DOJ
approved the arrangement by finding that the pool would provide procompetitive benefits and mitigate anticompetitive damages. The DOJ found
that the structure of the pool was well suited because only essential patents
were included, not substitutes.84
The DOJ Letters also identified specific potential competitive concerns
and provided a roadmap on how to minimize antitrust risk. The ways a pool
might restrict competition includes: restrictions among the pool participants,
restrictions of downstream products incorporating pool patents, and
restrictions in innovation among the pool.85 To prevent such concerns, the
letters provides a guideline for when a patent pool may gain approval: (1)

suppliers when it raises its price, because this reduces the number of units in the downstream
product that are sold.” Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2013–14 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
79. See Alan Daley, The Consumer Interest in Patent Pools, THE HILL (Apr. 4, 2014),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/judicial/202613-the-consumer-interest-in-patent-pools.
80. Id.
81. See MPEG LA PATENT POOL, http://www.mpegla.com; see, e.g., Carlson, supra note 67.
82. See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., to Gerrard R. Beeney,
Att’y Sullivan & Cromwell (June 26, 1997) (on file with the U.S. Department of Justice)
[hereinafter MPEG Letter]; Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., to Gerrard
R. Beeney, Att’y Sullivan & Cromwell (Dec. 16, 1998) (on file with the U.S. Department of Justice)
[hereinafter DVD 3C Business Review Letter]; Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Dep’t of Just., to Casey R. Ramos, Att’y Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (June 10, 1999)
(on file with the U.S. Department of Justice) [hereinafter DVD 6C Business Review Letter]. (The
letters refer to the individual members of the pool, but those pools are generally known by the
number of companies in each pool); see also Howard Morse, Cross-Licensing and Patent Pools:
Legal Framework and Practical Issues, ABA ANTITRUST AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2002).
83. See Morse, supra note 82.
84. See MPEG Letter, supra note 82; see also Id.
85. Id.
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the patent must be valid and enforceable, (2) the pool must not aggregate
competitive technologies and set a single price for them, and (3) an
independent expert should determine if the patents are essential, and the pool
must not disadvantage competitors or facilitate collusion.86
The FTC’s IP Guidelines provided much needed clarity regarding the
interaction of antitrust and patent laws. In general, the formation of patent
pools and other cross-licensing arrangements will be approved where the
procompetitive benefits are compelling under the rule of reason. However,
enforcement action may be warranted in certain situations to protect public
interests in competition. Under this framework, the next section will analyze
the LOT Network for potential antitrust liability.

IV. LOT Network Under Antitrust Scrutiny
In the DOJ’s IP Licensing guidelines, the Agencies’ main concerns are:
(1) “horizontal coordination among the pool’s licensors [which] could lead
to a reduction in price competition downstream products,” and (2)
“combining patent rights in a pool [that] could discourage [research and
development] [“R&D”], new product development, and cost-reducing
process innovations.”87 Generally, the vast majority of these arrangements
are evaluated under the rule of reason.88
The rule of reason has been described as a “middle ground” between
the traditional per se rules of illegality and the “quick-look approach” to
evaluating antitrust litigation.89 There, the Court explained that “trial courts
can structure antitrust litigation so as to avoid, on one hand, the use of
antitrust theories too abbreviated to permit proper analysis, and, on the other
hand, consideration of every possible fact or theory irrespective of the
minimal light it may shed . . .”90 Nonetheless, the Court added that instead
of a full rule of reason inquiry, lower courts should use a “sliding scale in
appraising reasonableness, and as such the quality of proof required should
vary with the circumstances.”91

86.
87.

Id.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 1, 67 (2007),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/222655.pdf [hereinafter Antitrust
Enforcement & IP Rights].
88. See IP Licensing Guidelines, supra note 24.
89. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
90. Id. at 2238.
91. Id. at 2237–2238 (internal quotation marks omitted)(citing California Dental Ass’n v.
F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756 (1999)).

Summer 2017]

LOT NETwork

177

That being said, the rule of reason is applied in a series of steps in a
traditional antitrust analysis.92 The first step is that the plaintiff must show
that certain behavior restrains competition in a market.93 Second, if the
plaintiff can meet this threshold, then the burden shifts to the defendant to
show that the behavior serves a legitimate purpose.94 Then, the plaintiff has
to rebut this by showing that the defendant can achieve the same objective with
less restrictive alternatives.95 Finally, the court balances the harms and benefits
of the restraint to determine if the restraint is anticompetitive.96
A. Horizontal Coordination Leading to a Reduction in Price Competition

Traditionally, the main threat of horizontal coordination is that
competitors in the same market collude together to set prices. The Agencies
are specifically concerned that “horizontal coordination among the pool’s
licensors could lead to a reduction in price competition among downstream
products.”97 In other words, the core concern of antitrust law is to prevent
horizontal competitors from harming downstream consumers by colluding
to set prices.98 Even though a patent licensing arrangement might have
strong pro-competitive benefits, the Agencies will look closely to see if a
particular pooling arrangement can be anticompetitive. For example, the
Guidelines state that a pool can be anticompetitive if (1) it excludes firms
such that those excluded cannot compete in the relevant market and (2) the
pool participants collectively possess market power in a relevant market.99
The LOT Network is an open conditional licensing pool that can attract
(and actually has) competitors or potential competitors.100 The LOT
Network describes itself as a “non-profit community of companies . . . who
believe that good corporate citizens don’t monetize patents through patent
trolls.”101 However, besides being members of the same network or
community, there are no mechanisms for sharing information or
coordinating actions among participants. In fact, the LOT Agreement “does

92. See Feldman, supra note 25, at 138.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 139.
97. See Antitrust Enforcement & IP Rights, supra note 87, at 8.
98. See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher et al., 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2005).
99. See Ewing & Feldman, supra note 4, at 36.
100. See LOT Website Members List, LOT NETWORK, http://lotnet.com/lot-network-memberlist/ (For example, the LOT Network currently includes automakers Ford, Subaru, Mazda, Hyundai,
and Kia).
101. See LOT Website, supra note 1.
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not create any relationship of agency, partnership or joint venture among the
LOT Users or its Affiliates.”102 Other than through joining the LOT Network
via the LOT Agreement, members companies do not have any formal
mechanisms for communications. Further, the LOT Agreement is written in
a way that “obviate[s] the need of members to give notice, prepare covenants,
or track patents that are transferred.”103 There is no requirement nor need for
members to communicate with each other. Also, the LOT Administration is
not a centralized entity that can coordinate the actions of the participants or
collectively price the pooled patents — it merely administers the LOT
Agreement and maintains the network.
It might prove difficult to name the LOT Network and its constituent
members as an antitrust defendant. Unlike organizations like RPX, LOT
Network does not have a centralized structure where an entity can coordinate
the activity of its members.104 Of course, a party could assert that the
existence of the LOT Network is a conspiracy in itself to prevent certain
companies from becoming LOT members. Specifically, a member company
must not derive 50% of revenue from patent assertion activity.105 However,
proving antitrust liability would be difficult since the excluded companies
are not actually competitors since PAEs, by definition, do not actually
produce their own products. If they did, they lose their most valuable
defense against operating companies — they can now be countersued for
infringing on one of their opponents’ patents. Thus, it is very unlikely that
an agency or court would find this type of exclusion to be anticompetitive.
Operating companies can still use their patents however they wish and
licenses will never vest so long as the patent holder is not a PAE. The LOT
Agreement does not place any restraints on trade and does not restrict the
sale of any patents, even sales to PAEs. There is the possibility that the
patent itself might be devalued since it is not as a valuable to certain buyers,

102. LOT Agreement Version 2.0, supra note 32, at ¶ 5.1.
103. LOT Agreement FAQs, supra note 21.
104. See Cascades Computer Innovation LLC v. RPX Corp., No 12-CV-1143 YGR, 2013 WL
6247594, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) (RPX was accused of a hub-and-spoke conspiracy to
monopolize a market by having members agree to not sell above a certain price for patents owned
by Cascades).
105. LOT Agreement Version 2.0, supra note 32, at ¶ 6.15 (“Patent Assertion” means either of
the following assertions of rights under a Patent against another Entity: (i) asserting (including but
not limited to via a written or oral demand) a claim of Infringement of such Patent for the primary
purpose of deriving royalties or other monetary compensation under such Patent, or (ii) the
commencement or subsequent pursuit of a claim, action or proceeding in a judicial, administrative
or other governmental body, including but not limited to a court (in any country) or the U.S.
International Trade Commission, based in whole or in part on a claim of Infringement of such
Patent.).
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but that is unlikely to deter innovation, as discussed below. In fact, the procompetitive benefits of discouraging PAE acquisition of LOT-pledged
patents might outweigh having a patent with decreased value. Thus, it is
doubtful that the LOT Network would be seen as impermissible horizontal
coordination.
B. Predatory Pricing

The regulatory Agencies’ ultimate concern is that horizontal
coordination will eventually lead to predatory pricing. If the LOT Network
is seen as impermissible horizontal coordination between competitors, the
next step would be to see if this behavior leads to predatory pricing. As the
LOT Network does not set prices to patents and patent sales directly, it is
unlikely that there would be any anticompetitive concerns.
Although the LOT Network is unlikely to be found liable based on
horizontal coordination, it would be helpful to discuss when an entity might
be found liable of predatory pricing. First, an entity needs to offer a product
at artificially low prices; second, the low pricing results in driving out
competitors; and finally, the entity raises prices above what is nominal in a
competitive market.106
Unlike other entities, like Intellectual Venture, that aggregate patents in
order to make a return on investment; the LOT Network does not directly set
prices for or controls patents.107 An argument can be made that the LOT
Network offers its patents at lower costs to those inside the network — that
the cross licensing is a cover for establishing market dominance. Or that the
prices of the patents are depressed and therefore will lead to a subsequent
rise in prices of the good produced. Perhaps a downstream manufacturer
bought a LOT-pledged patent from a PAE and now must negotiate with
competitor inside the LOT Network who holds a license.
However, competition is a good thing; after all, antitrust law protects
competition, not competitors.108 Patents inside the LOT Network remain
with their respective owners, and only a nonexclusive license is granted upon
a triggering event. That alone would not establish market dominance for
LOT participants — it simply grants a defensive shield against PAE
litigation and potentially a license to practice the patent. And finally, as

106. See Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 584 (1986).
107. See Ewing & Feldman; supra note 4, at 10–12 (Intellectual Ventures licenses or sell
patents “on demand” to third party companies, sometimes under the threat of litigation or filing
lawsuits for infringement.).
108. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993).
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others now hold a full license to practice a patent, that could mean more
competitors and potentially lower prices.
Competitor and downstream costs are unaffected by participating in the
LOT Network. For example, imagine a three-tiered distributions chain.
Company A (LOT) is the first component maker, Company B (LOT)
incorporates Company A’s inputs, and Company C (non-LOT) finishes the
consumer widget with Company B’s components. Now imagine that
Company A goes bankrupt and sells its entire portfolio to a PAE. This
triggers Company B (and all other LOT participants) to receive a fully vested
license to Company A’s patents, including the ones used for Company B’s
inputs. Since Company B is immune to suits for any components derived
from Company A’s patents, so long as B can continue to source those parts
(or make it themselves) prices will generally be unaffected (at least directly
related to being a LOT member) since they do not have to worry about a
potential lawsuit. Company C, on the other hand, might be liable since they
use the component that includes a part from Company A. However, by the
first sale doctrine, buying the part from Company B actually frees it from the
patent monopoly.109 Thus, the consumers do not experience a price increase.
In fact, the consumer benefits and it is likely that the LOT Network will not
be liable for predatory pricing.
C. Discouraging Innovation

Another concern of the regulatory Agencies is that a patent pooling
arrangements “could discourage R&D, new product development, and costreducing process innovations.”110 In an arrangement involving horizontal
competitors, the Agencies look at whether the effects are pro-competitive
(efficiency-enhancing) or do not diminish competition among competitors
or potential competitors.111
The LOT Network is unlikely to be seen as an impediment to innovation
despite a possible drop in the market value of the LOT patents. In certain
circumstances, the value of the patents transferred may be reduced because
some buyers would not value the patent as much as a non-burdened patent.112
However, “[i]t is the overall benefit of society, rather than the benefits to an

109. See Feldman, supra note 25, at 147.
110. See Wallace v. IBM, 467 F.3d 1104, 1006 (7th Cir. 2006).
111. See IP Licensing Guidelines, supra note 24, at 24.
112. David L. Hayes & Eric C. Schulman, A Proposal for a License on Transfer (LOT)
Agreement, (July 27, 2013) (unpublished paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2224355. (Working
Draft – For Discussion Purposes Only Updated July 27, 2013).
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individual inventor, that is paramount to the patent system.”113 As the LOT
Agreement continues to apply to patents after a sale, certain buyers may be
hesitant to purchase a LOT-pledged patent. These buyers do not have much
to worry about: so long as the buyer is not or does not become a PAE, the
LOT licenses will not trigger.
Buyers, including PAEs are not actually precluded from purchasing any
patents. Instead, PAEs who acquire one of these patents can still use them
for whatever nefarious reasons they desire, just not against LOT members.
Also, LOT Network does not compete with other patent pools or aggregators
in the purchasing and licensing of patents. In fact, other defensive patent
aggregators can acquire a LOT-pledged patent to cross license to their own
subscribers. Thus, the market price for patents should be largely unaffected
by who is within or outside the LOT Network. Since the market rate for
patents should not be affected, innovation should not be negatively impacted
just because a patent is part of the LOT Network.
Similarly, the LOT Network could be seen as a field of use restriction
— a limit on what a licensee is able to do with a patented product. Usually
a limit would be placed on what the licensee is able to make with a patented
invention.114 Courts have been inconsistent in their results and analysis
regarding the validity of a field of use restriction.115 As a general matter,
however, courts usually allow any restrictions on downstream products that
contain a patented product as a component.116
Under a similar analysis, the LOT Network can be seen as a limit on
what a PAE can do with a LOT-pledged patent. The PAE who acquires or
is licensed a LOT-pledged patent is limited on the amount of companies that
they will be able to assert the patent against. However, since a PAE does not
actually product anything, this is not the type of behavior that antitrust
agencies would traditionally be concerned with.
D. Pro-competitive Benefits

Restraints in a licensing agreement that do not have anticompetitive
effects are usually unchallenged by the Agencies. If, however, the Agencies

113. Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 399, 400 (2003).
114. See Feldman, supra note 25, at 145; see, e.g., Barr Rubber Prod. Co. v. Sun Rubber Co.,
277 F. Supp. 484, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) aff’g 425 F.2d. 1114 (2d Cir. 1970) (finding that a patent
holder can license one firm their process while denying the same process to other licensees).
115. See Feldman, supra note 25, at 146.
116. Id. at 150–151; see also Monsanto v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding
that Monsanto held rights to second-generation soybean seeds because the seeds contained
Monsanto’s patented genetic sequence).
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find that a restraint is likely to have an anticompetitive effect, the Agencies
will first determine if the restraint is reasonably necessary and then weigh
the restraint against the pro-competitive benefits.117
As mentioned above, there is little risk that the LOT Network will be
seen to be anticompetitive. But, in the event that a restraint is seen as such,
the anticompetitive risks “may be insignificant compared to the expected
efficiencies . . .”118
The main benefit of the LOT Network is the reduction in viable patents
available to PAEs, hopefully leading to a reduction in patent litigation by
disarmament. The LOT Network benefits LOT users in two ways: direct
protection and long-term risk reduction.119 First, LOT members are
protected from litigation involving specific patents transferred by another
member to a PAE. Second, with a lessened threat of possible litigation,
companies could divert money that would otherwise be earmarked for
litigation into R&D. The risk reduction increases, as more operating
companies become a part of the LOT Network.
Although there is little risk that the LOT Network will raise any alarms
about impermissible horizontal coordination, competitors can benefit from
the LOT model. By obtaining full licenses to specific patents, a competitor
in the LOT Network can possibly make that specific invention after a transfer
to a PAE. This is good for downstream buyers because there is potentially a
new supplier that can provide the invention without the risk of being sued by
the new patent owner. Also, the LOT Network “provides like-minded
companies with a self-help approach to the dramatic increase in patent
litigation.”120
In addition, “[r]estraints that encourage licensees to develop and market
the licensed technology or that reduce the transaction costs of licensing the
technology are more likely to be found reasonable.”121 The restraints placed
on the LOT-pledged patents would help develop and market technologies by
reducing the chances of a PAE suit and subsequently reallocating resources
away from a litigation fund. It also alleviates some uncertainty in supply
chains. Buying from suppliers that are at risk for patent infringement (even
if unmerited) increases the risk to the entire supply chain — upstream sellers
risk losing sales and downstream buyers risk losing a supplier. By

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See IP Licensing Guidelines, supra note 24, at 21.
Id.
LOT Agreement FAQs, supra note 21.
Hayes & Schulman, supra note 112, at 3.
See Antitrust Enforcement & IP Rights, supra note 87, at 10.
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inoculating portions of the supply chain, in certain settings, may lead to
lower costs, lower indemnification obligations, and higher outputs.
Further, these restraints protect members from privateering — “a
practice where an operating company sells patents to a troll hoping the troll
will then attack its competitors.”122 Privateering can raise rivals’ costs “by
increasing the ability or incentives to enforce the transferred patents.”123
Although the LOT Network protects participants from the threat of
privateering, members are still free to sue one another. However, the threat
of litigation from another LOT member would probably be for a merited
claim and unlikely to raise costs like a PAE litigation. Presumably a
settlement obtained by a privateering PAE would cause an operating
company “higher costs, lower sales, and impaired scale” and consumers
“higher prices in both the short term (because the PAE is induced to seek a
running royalty when it otherwise might prefer an immediate lump sum
payment) and the long term (from impairment of rivals).”124 Thus, the
conditional licenses granted by the LOT Agreement may lower transactional
costs for LOT participants.
Given the range of pro-competitive benefits to LOT members and
perhaps others in the supply chain, it would be difficult for a regulatory
Agency to find that the LOT Network runs afoul of antitrust laws.

V. Conclusion
The current state of the patent system begs for innovative measures to
curb abuse by PAEs. The LOT Network is merely one method by private
entities attempting to curb PAE initiated lawsuits. The LOT Agreement is a
carefully crafted patent licensing agreement that should be able to withstand
an antitrust scrutiny by PAEs and reduce the amount of PAE suits based on
patents obtained from operating companies. It neither provides a vehicle for
horizontal coordination nor discourages innovation. The LOT Agreement
provides many pro-competitive benefits in increasing the freedom to operate
for operating companies. When smaller companies fail and sell patents to
PAEs, the LOT Agreement protects the remaining members of the pool
against the threat of litigation.

122. Belcher & Casey, supra note 15, at 14.
123. Mark S. Popofsky & Michael D. Laufert, Antitrust Attacks on Patent Assertion Entities,
79 ANTITRUST L.J. 445, 456 (2014).
124. Id. at 460 (explaining the possible effects of an operating company paying a PAE to raise
rivals’ costs; incentivizing the PAE to accept a running royalty by compensating them for the
difference between a lump sum settlement versus a running royalty).
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Although antirust agencies and laws continue to evolve, the procompetitive aspects of the LOT Agreement will mean that it will continue to
be an attractive option for operating companies that wish to reduce the risk
of PAE litigation.

